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ABSTRACT
The increasing popularity of VoIP telephony has brought a lot of attention and
concern over security and privacy issues of VoIP communication. This thesis proposes
a new class of traffic analysis attacks to encrypted VoIP calls. The goal of these
attacks is to detect speaker or speech of encrypted VoIP calls. The proposed traffic
analysis attacks exploit silent suppression, an essential feature of VoIP telephony.
These attacks are based on application-level features so that the attacks can detect
the same speech or the same speaker of different VoIP calls made with different VoIP
codecs. We evaluate the proposed attacks by extensive experiments over different type
of networks including commercialized anonymity networks and campus networks. The
experiments show that the proposed traffic analysis attacks can detect speaker and
speech of encrypted VoIP calls with a high detection rate which is a great improvement
comparing with random guess. With the help of intersection attacks, the detection
rate for speaker detection can be increased. In order to shield the detrimental effect of
this proposed attacks, a countermeasure is proposed to mitigate the proposed traffic
analysis attacks.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This thesis addresses on privacy issues of encrypted Voice over Internet Protocol
(VoIP) calls. A class of traffic analysis attacks is proposed to compromise the privacy
of encrypted VoIP calls. In this thesis, a countermeasure is proposed and studied to
the class of traffic analysis attacks.
With the rapid growth of broadband Internet access services, the popularity
of VoIP calls has grown significantly. As a competitor with traditional phone services
provided over Public Switched Telephone Networks (PSTN), VoIP services are known
for their lower cost and richer features.
The increasing popularity of VoIP telephony has brought a lot of attention
and concern over security and privacy issues of VoIP communication. To protect
confidentiality of VoIP calls, advanced users encrypt VoIP packets with Zfone [1] or
SRTP [2], the secure version of real time transport protocol.
To further protect privacy of VoIP calls, advanced users are using anonymity
networks to anonymize VoIP calls. For this purpose, low-latency anonymity networks
such as Tor [3] and JAP [4] can be used. The common anonymizing technique used
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in anonymity networks is rerouting which usually routes packets through a random-
selected and usually longer path instead of the shortest path.
A class of passive traffic analysis attacks is proposed to compromise privacy of
encrypted VoIP calls in this thesis. The procedure of proposed attacks is as follows:
First, the adversary collects traces of encrypted VoIP calls made by a victim, say
Alice. The adversary then extracts application-level features of Alice’s VoIP calls
and trains a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) with the extracted features. To test
whether a call of interest is made by Alice, the adversary can extract features from
the traces of the call and calculate likelihood of the calls made by Alice. The proposed
attacks can detect speeches or speakers of encrypted calls with a high probability. In
this thesis, two kinds of VoIP calls are involved: Skype and SIP-Based VoIP calls.
Because these two kinds of VoIP calls are two primary VoIP calls.
In comparison with traditional traffic analysis attacks, the proposed traffic
analysis attacks are different in the following aspects: (a) The proposed traffic anal-
ysis attacks are at application-level, and traditional traffic analysis attacks are at
transport-level or network-level: The proposed traffic analysis attack aim to detect
speeches or speakers of VoIP calls, and these detections are at application-level. Traf-
fic analysis used in these proposed attacks is based on application-level features. Most
traditional traffic analysis attacks [5, 6, 7, 8] aim to identify traffic flows, and these
identifications are at transport-level or network-level. These traditional traffic analy-
ses are based on transport-level or network-level features such as correlation between
traffic flows at sending end and receiving end. (b) Because of the previous difference,
the proposed traffic analysis attacks are more practical: (a) The proposed traffic
analysis attacks do not require simultaneous access to traffic flows at both ends. But
the simultaneous access is usually required for traditional traffic analysis attacks. For
international VoIP calls, simultaneous access at both ends of calls may not be possi-
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ble in practice. (b) The attacks can detect the same speech or the same speaker of
different VoIP calls made with different VoIP codecs and protocols.
The contributions made in this thesis are summarized as follows:
• A class of traffic analysis attacks to compromise privacy of encrypted VoIP calls
is proposed. The attacks are passive and based on the HMM, a powerful tool
to model temporal data. It also proposes a method to extract application level
features from traffic flows for application-level traffic analysis attacks.
• The proposed traffic analysis attacks are evaluated through extensive experi-
ments over the Internet and commercial anonymity networks. For most of VoIP
calls made in the experiments, the two parties are at least 20 hops away, and
end-to-end delay between the two parties is at least 80ms. The experiments
show that the traffic analysis attacks are able to detect speeches or speakers of
encrypted VoIP calls with a high probability.
• Intersection attacks are proposed to improve the effectiveness of the proposed
attacks.
• A countermeasure is proposed to mitigate the proposed traffic analysis attacks
and analyzed the effect of the countermeasure on quality of VoIP calls.
The organization of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews re-
lated work. In Chapter 4, the details of proposed traffic analysis attacks on Skype
VoIP calls are descried. Chapter 3 introduces the traffic analysis attacks on SIP-Based
VoIP Calls. Finally, the conclusion is offered in Chapter 5.
3
CHAPTER II
RELATED WORK
In this chapter, we review related work on low-latency anonymity networks
and related traffic analysis attacks.
2.1 Low-Latency Anonymity Networks
After Chaum proposed the anonymous communication for email in his seminal
paper [9], many low-latency anonymity networks have been proposed or even imple-
mented for different applications. The examples are ISDN-mixes [10] for telephony,
Web Mix [4] for web browsing, MorphMix [11] for peer-to-peer applications, GAP
base GNUnet [12] for file sharing. TARZAN [13], Onion Router [14], and Tor [3], the
second-generation onion router, are designed for general usage by low-latency applica-
tions. Especially Tor has some desirable features for low-latency applications such as
perfect forward secrecy and congestion control. In this thesis, we used the anonymity
network managed by findnot.com to anonymize VoIP calls instead of the Tor net-
work, because UDP traffic is not natively supported by Tor. The commercialized
4
anonymous communication services provided by findnot.com can allow us to route
VoIP packets through entry points located in different countries into the anonymity
network.
Common techniques used in low-latency anonymity networks are encryption
and re-routing. Encryption prevents packet content access by adversaries. To confuse
adversaries, anonymity networks using re-routing techniques forward encrypted pack-
ets in a usually longer and random path instead of using the shortest path between
the sender and the receiver. To attack an anonymity network using the re-routing
technique, the attacker usually needs to be more powerful, for example, to be a global
attacker.
2.2 Traffic Analysis Attacks
Traffic analysis attacks can be classified into two categories, network-level traf-
fic analysis attacks and application-level traffic analysis attacks. Network-level traf-
fic analysis attacks target at disclosing network-level or transport-level information.
Most privacy-related network-level traffic analysis attacks focus on traffic flow iden-
tification or traffic flow tracking. The examples are Levine et al. [5] on anonymity
networks, the active attack proposed by Murdoch and Danezis [8] on Tor network,
and the flow correlation attacks [6]. Application-level traffic analysis attacks target
at disclosing application-level information. The examples are keystrokes detection
based on packet timing [15], web page identification [16], spoken phrase identification
[17] with variable bit rate codecs.
The traffic analysis attacks proposed in this thesis are at application-level.
These attacks can detect speeches or speakers of encrypted VoIP calls based on talk
patterns, the application-level features which do not vary from call to call.
5
CHAPTER III
TRAFFIC ANALYSIS ATTACKS ON
SIP-BASED ENCRYPTED VOIP CALLS
In this chapter, we address on privacy issues of SIP-Based encrypted VoIP
calls. A class of traffic analysis attacks is proposed to compromise the privacy of
encrypted SIP-Based VoIP calls. We propose and study countermeasures to the class
of traffic analysis attacks in this chapter.
The increasing popularity of VoIP telephony has brought a lot of attention and
concern over security and privacy issues of VoIP communication. To protect confi-
dentiality of VoIP calls, advanced users encrypt VoIP packets with Zfone [1] or SRTP
[2], the secure version of Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP). To further protect
privacy of VoIP calls, advanced users are using anonymity networks to anonymize
VoIP calls. For this purpose, low-latency anonymity networks such as Tor [3] and
JAP [4] can be used. One of the common anonymizing techniques used in anonymity
networks is rerouting which usually routes packets through a randomly selected and
usually longer path instead of the shortest path.
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In this chapter, we propose a class of passive traffic analysis attacks to compro-
mise privacy of encrypted VoIP calls. The procedure of proposed attacks is as follows:
First an adversary collects traces of encrypted VoIP calls made by a victim, say Al-
ice. The adversary then extracts application-level features of Alice’s VoIP calls and
trains a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) with the extracted features. To test whether
a call of interest is made by Alice, the adversary can extract features from the trace
of interest and calculate likelihood of the call being made by Alice. The proposed
attacks can detect speeches or speakers of encrypted calls with high probabilities. In
comparison with traditional traffic analysis attacks, the proposed traffic analysis at-
tacks are different in the following aspects: (a) The proposed traffic analysis attacks
do not require simultaneous access to one traffic flow of interest at both sides. (b)
The attacks can detect the same speech or the same speaker of different VoIP calls
made with different VoIP codecs.
3.1 Background
In this section, we first review protocols used in current VoIP communica-
tions and then proceed with review of key principles in speech coding and silence
suppression related to VoIP communication and the proposed traffic analysis attacks.
In general, VoIP protocols can be classified into two categories: (a) Signaling
protocols: These protocols are designed for call setup and termination. SIP [18] and
H.323 [19] are two of most widely-used signaling protocols for VoIP. (b) Transport
protocols: These protocols are designed to transfer voice packets. A typical example
is Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [20]. Most current mass-market VoIP services
such as Vonage [21] and AT&T CallVantage [22] use SIP and RTP as the signaling
protocol and the transport protocol respectively. One exception is Skype VoIP service
that uses a proprietary protocol. In this chapter, we focus on mass-market VoIP
7
services based on SIP and RTP protocols.
3.1.1 Speech Coding
In VoIP telephony, an analog voice signal is first converted into a voice data
stream by a chosen codec. Typically in this step, compression is used to reduce data
rate. The voice data stream is then packetized in small units of typically tens of
milliseconds of voice, and encapsulated in a packet stream over the Internet.
We focus on Constant Bit Rate (CBR) codecs in this project since most codecs
used in current VoIP telephony are CBR codecs1. In this thesis, we evaluate the
proposed traffic analysis attacks against codecs of various bit rates.
3.1.2 Silence Suppression
To further save bandwidth, VoIP telephony employs functionality known as
silence suppression or voice activity detection (VAD). The main idea of silence sup-
pression is to disable voice packet transmission when one of the parties involved in
a call is silence. To prevent the other party from suspecting that the call is dead
and then dropping the call, comfort noise is generated at the receiving side. Silence
suppression is a general feature supported in codecs, VoIP softwares, and RTP.
A silence detector makes voice-activity decision based on voice frame energy,
equivalent as average voice sample energy of a VoIP packet. If the frame energy is
below a threshold, the voice detector declares silence. Traditional silence detectors
[23] use fixed energy thresholds. Because of the changing nature of background noise,
adaptive energy thresholds are used in modern silence detectors such as NeVoT SD
1Variable Bit Rate (VBR) codecs are primarily used for coding audio files instead of voice com-
munication [23]. Recently there are interests in using VBR codec such as Speex [24] for VoIP
telephony. But no implementation is publicly available according to our knowledge. We believe
proposed traffic analysis attacks can also be launched against VoIP services using VBR codecs since
silence suppression is a general feature of VoIP codecs.
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Table I: Major Parameters of G.729B Silence Detector
Parameter Meaning Default
Min Threshold Frame energy below which any signal is considered silence -55 dB
Silence Threshold Threshold used in detecting silence in signals Dynamic
Hangover Time Delay of silence decision Dynamic
(a) Voice Signal Waveform
50 55 60 65 70 75 80
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Time (s)
W
av
ef
or
m
 (p
erc
en
tag
e)
50 55 60 65 70 75 80
0
1
2
TIme (s)
Pa
ck
et
 C
ou
nt
(b) Packet Train
Figure 1: An Example of Silence Suppression
[25] and G.729B [26]. Major parameters of G.729B silence detector, one of the most
popular silence detectors, are listed in Table I.
Hangover techniques are used in silence detectors to avoid sudden end-clipping
of speeches. During hangover time, voice packets are still transmitted even when the
frame energy is below the energy threshold. Traditional silence detectors use fixed-
length hangover time. For modern silence detectors such as G.729B, the length of
hangover time dynamically changes according to the energy of previous frames and
noise.
Figure 1 shows an example of silence suppression. Figure 1.(a) shows the
waveform of a sheriff’s voice signal extracted from a video published at cnn.com [27].
Figure 1.(b) shows the packet train generated by feeding the voice signal to X-Lite
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[28], a popular VoIP client. From Figure 1, we can easily observe the correspondence
between silence periods in the voice signal and gaps in the packet train. The length of
a silence period will be different from the length of the corresponding gap in a packet
train because of the hangover technique.
The proposed traffic analysis attacks exploit silence suppression. Different
people have different talk patterns in terms of talk spurts and silence gaps. For
example, some persons speak very fast with only a couple of short silence gaps while
some speak with long silence gaps. As shown in Figure 1, an eavesdropper can learn
a speaker’s talk pattern from packet timing. Based on talk patterns learned from
packet timing, the proposed traffic analysis attacks can detect speeches or speakers
of encrypted VoIP calls with high accuracy.
3.2 Problem Definition
In this chapter, we are interested in analyzing the traffic of encrypted VoIP
calls through anonymity networks. We focus on detecting speeches and speakers of
encrypted VoIP calls by analyzing the sensitive information revealed from the traffic
pattern at application-level.
The typical attack scenario focused in this chapter is as follows: An adversary
may want to detect whether the target speaker, say Alice, is communicating with
Bob now or not based on the previous encrypted VoIP calls made by Alice. The
previous calls may use different codecs than the one Alice using now. The adversary
may collect VoIP packets at any point on the path from Alice to Bob and may also
want to detect the content of the conversation, such as a partial speech in previous
calls.
Comparing with previous researches, the proposed attacks do not require si-
multaneous access to both sides of the links connected to Alice and Bob. Traces
10
 
 

	
 













ﬀ
ﬁﬂﬃ

ﬂﬁ ﬃ
 !
"
#

ﬃ ﬃ
 !
Figure 2: Network Model
of calls used in detection can be collected at different time and in different network
environment and these calls possibly made with different codecs.
3.2.1 Network Model
In this chapter, we also assume Alice uses mass-market VoIP services to com-
municate with Bob as shown in Figure 2. In other words, we assume SIP and RTP
are used as the signaling protocol and the transport protocol respectively. To protect
confidentiality of her VoIP calls, we assume Alice encrypts her VoIP packets by using
secure versions of the RTP protocol such as SRTP [2] and ZRTP used in Zphone [1].
To better protect privacy of her calls, we assume Alice routes these encrypted
VoIP calls through anonymity networks as shown in Figure 2. For better voice quality,
Alice can use low-latency anonymity networks such as Tor [3] and JAP [4].
3.2.2 Threat Model
We focus on passive attacks in this thesis. In other words, the attacks launched
by the adversary will not disturb existing network traffic. In comparison with active
attacks, the proposed attacks are harder to detect. We assume that the adversary
11
only has access to the links directly connected to participants of VoIP calls. This
assumption is widely used in traffic analysis attacks such as attacks on anonymity
networks and tracing VoIP calls [5, 8, 29, 30]. We do not assume the adversary as a
global attacker because rerouting techniques used in anonymity networks make global
attacks too costly to be practical. The threat model is weaker than threaten models
defined for traditional privacy-related traffic analysis attacks: The threat model does
not require simultaneous access to the links connected to participants of a VoIP
call which may not be feasible for international VoIP calls. Instead we assume the
adversary can collect traces of VoIP calls made by Alice in advance and use these
collected traces to detect whether Alice is a participant in the VoIP conversation
of interest. Our model is similar as the model for identifying a human being by
fingerprints: Fingerprints of human beings are collected in advance through driver
license applications. To identify a specific person, the fingerprint of interest such
as a fingerprint in a crime scene will be compared against the person’s fingerprints
collected in advance.
The threat model assumes the detections are based on different VoIP calls. So
the speaker identification should also be independent of the voice content of VoIP
calls.
3.3 Detecting Speeches and Speakers of SIP-Based
VoIP Calls
In this section, we describe traffic analysis attacks to detect speeches or speak-
ers of SIP-Based encrypted VoIP calls. We begin the section with an overview of
the proposed traffic analysis attacks and details of each step in our algorithm are
described after the overview.
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3.3.1 Overview
The proposed traffic analysis attacks are based on packet timing information.
As described in Section 3.1.2, silence suppression enables adversaries to recover talk
patterns in terms of talk spurts and silence gaps from packet timing. Adversaries can
create a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) to model Alice’s talk pattern recovered from
SIP-Based encrypted VoIP calls made by her. When adversaries want to determine
which SIP-Based encrypted VoIP call is made by Alice, adversaries can check talk
patterns recovered from the call of interest against Alice’s model.
The proposed attacks can be divided into two phases: the training phase and
the detection phase as shown in Figure 3. The two steps in the training phase are
feature extraction and HMMs training. The detection phase consists of three steps:
feature extraction, speech detection or speaker detection, and intersection attack.
The last step, intersection attack, is optional. We describe the details of each step
below.
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Figure 3: The Proposed Attack
3.3.2 Feature Extraction
The input and output of the feature extraction step are raw traces of VoIP calls
and feature vectors respectively. The feature vector used in the proposed attacks is
13
shown below: 

ts1 ts2 · · · tsn
sg1 sg2 · · · sgn


where n is the length of a feature vector, tsi and sgj denote the length of the ith talk
spurt and the jth silence gap respectively.
Talk spurts and silence gaps are differentiated by a silence threshold Tsilence: If
an inter-packet time is larger than the threshold, the inter-packet time is declared as
a silence gap. Otherwise the inter-packet time is declared as a part of one talk spurt.
Obviously the threshold Tsilence is critical to overall detection performance. We
did initial experiments to investigate the suitable range of the threshold for detection:
We feed voice signals to VoIP clients and collect VoIP packets generated by VoIP
clients. Different values of the threshold Tsilence are used to determine silence gaps.
Actual silence gaps can be found by checking marker bits in RTP packets which
indicate the start of talk spurts2. We evaluate a value of the threshold by two metrics:
false positive rate and false negative rate. False positive rate is the fraction of talk
spurts that were erroneously declared as silence gaps. False negative rate is the
fraction of silences gaps that are erroneously declared as talk spurts. The experiment
results with different codecs3 are shown in Figure 4.
We can observe that for a wide range of the threshold Tsilence, both the false
positive rate and the false negative rate are low: When Tsilence is larger than 70ms,
the false positive rate is below 10% for all the codecs. The false negative rate is below
20% when Tsilence is less than 100ms. The wide range is because of the big difference
between inter-packet time of silence gaps and inter-packet time of talk spurts: Silence
gaps are in order of seconds. Inter-packet time during talk spurts is usually around
2Only in our initial experiments, VoIP packets are not encrypted so that we can determine actual
silence gaps from marker bits and then find suitable range of the threshold for detection. For all the
other experiments, VoIP packets are encrypted and proposed traffic analysis attacks have no access
to packet headers such as marker bit in the RTP protocol.
3Details of these codecs can be found in Table 3.1.
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Figure 4: Experiment Results on the Threshold Tsilence
packetization delay of 20ms or 30ms for most codecs.
We can also observe that increasing the threshold Tsilence decreases the false
positive rate and increases the false negative rate. The changes in these two rates
are again because the inter-packet time during silence gaps is larger than inter-packet
time during talk spurts.
A big challenge in feature extraction is to filter out noise caused by random net-
work delays in silence tests. Random network delays can cause errors in silence tests
especially at receiving side: Because of random packet delays, inter-packet time dur-
ing talk spurts can become larger than the threshold Tsilence. The main idea of filtering
noise in silence tests is to determine a silence gap based on N successive inter-packet
intervals instead of one inter-packet interval. The silence test with filtering techniques
works as follows: If one inter-packet interval is larger than the threshold Tsilence, we
declare a new silence gap only when none of the following ⌊ Tsilence
packetization delay
⌋ − 14
inter-packet intervals are shorter than a threshold Tspurt, used to filter out long inter-
packet intervals caused by network delays. The rationale behind the new silence tests
method is that: If an inter-packet interval is erroneously declared as a silence gap
4We use ⌊⌋ to denote floor operation.
15
0.0000.0040.0080.0120.0160.0200.0240.0280.0320.0360.0400
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
T
spurt (s)
R
m
a
tc
h
 
 
Silence Test  with Filtering
Original Silence Test 
Figure 5: Match Rate Rmatch vs. Threshold Tspurt (µlaw Codec)
because network delays increase the length of the inter-packet interval, then following
inter-packet intervals must likely be shorter than normal inter-packet intervals during
talk spurts. The new silence tests can improve silence detection performance in terms
of the false positive rate. The filtering does not focus on false negative errors because:
(a) The false negative rate changes very little when Tsilence changes. (b) We take into
account false negative errors in choices of HMM structures.
We compare the new silence test with the original silence test through empirical
experiments: The two parties in a call through the Internet are at least 20 hops away
from each other. In this set of experiments, we evaluate the choices of parameters
with the match rate Rmatch:
Rmatch =
The number of the gaps found in both sending side and receiving side
The number of the gaps found in sending side
Ideally, the match rate Rmatch should be 1 meaning that silence gaps detected at
sending side can match silence gaps detected at receiving side exactly. The experiment
results are shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5 shows that the filtering technique can significantly increase the match
16
rate Rmatch: The original silence test can only achieve match rate of 0.21. The silence
test with filtering techniques can achieve a match rate of 0.99 when Tspurt is between
3ms and 20ms. The match rate is low when Tspurt is less than 0.3ms because the
threshold Tspurt is too low to filter out large inter-packet intervals caused by network
delays. The match rate is low when Tspurt is larger than 20ms. It is because a tight
threshold Tspurt filters out most of silence gaps since normal inter-packet intervals
during talk spurts are of 20ms for µlaw codec. In following experiments, we set the
threshold Tspurt to be 10ms.
Feature vectors generated in this step are used for training or detection in
future steps.
3.3.3 HMMs Training
The input and output of this step are feature vectors and trained HMMs re-
spectively.
A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) based classifier is used to detect speeches
or speakers of VoIP calls. The HMM is a well-known tool to model temporal data
and it has been successfully used in temporal pattern recognition such as speech
recognition [31], handwriting recognition [32], and gesture recognition [33]. In the
proposed attacks, HMMs are trained to model talk patterns.
In this chapter, we consider each talk period including one talk spurt and one
silence gap as a hidden (invisible) state. The output observation from one state is
the length of a talk spurt and the following silence gap. Since each state corresponds
to a talk period, a VoIP speech is a process going through these hidden states. So
we use HMMs to model talk patterns. With the use of HMMs in our modeling, we
assume the Markov property holds. This assumption is widely used in speeches and
language modeling. Even when the assumption does not hold strictly, the extended
17
HMM can still work well [34].
Figure 6: HMM
The HMM used in traffic analysis attacks is the modified left-right HMM [34]
as shown in Figure 6. It is based on left-right models because of the nonergodic
nature of speech signals [34], i.e., the attribute of signals whose properties change over
time. The fundamental property of all left-right HMMs is that the state transition
coefficient from the ith state to the jth state (denoted as aij) is zero, when j is less
than i. Additional constraints are placed on the state transitions in the left-right
model to make sure that large changes in state diversion do not occur, i.e., aij = 0,
when j > i + ∆. For the well-known banded left-right model [34] and Bakis model
[35], ∆ is 1 and 2 respectively.
We extended classical left-right models to allow transition from the ith state to
the (i+3)th state, i.e., ∆ = 3, as hown in Figure 6. Our modification on the left-right
model is because of possible false negative errors made in the feature extraction step
and adaptive silence thresholds used in silence detectors as described in Section 3.1:
False negative errors made when some silence gaps are not detected in feature
extraction. The false negative errors can be caused by a large threshold Tsilence or
hangover time as described in Section 3.1. Hangover time reduces length of silence
gaps recovered from the packet timing since VoIP packets still being sent during the
18
beginning and the end of silence duration to avoid end-clipping of speeches. The
reduction can cause false negative errors in silence tests.
Adaptive silence thresholds used in silence detectors can cause different silence
detection results for the same speech in different VoIP calls. In modern codecs,
the threshold used in a silence detector dynamically changes to adapt to changes in
background noise. Because of the dynamically changing threshold, silence duration
in the same speech can be detected as silence in one call or as a part of a talk
spurt in another call. Although the inconsistent detection because of adaptive silence
threshold does not happen very often, it affects our overall speech detection and
speaker detection performance.
To take into account the possible false negative errors made in the feature ex-
traction and inconsistency of VoIP silence detectors, we allow state transition from
the ith state to the (i+3)th state because up to three actual neighboring talk periods
can be detected as one talk period in our analysis of VoIP call traces. Our exper-
iments with different left-right models also show that the modified left-right model
can achieve better detection performance than other left-right models.
In the modified HMM, the number of states are heuristically set to be 10
according to length of feature vectors. Following the principle of Occam’s razor, the
number of states should be small enough to avoid over-fitting and large enough to
model the ergodic nature of VoIP calls. We get similar detection performance for
different number of states when the number of states is larger than five, as shown
in Figure 7. When the number of state is too large, the training of HMMs fails to
converge to an optimal solution.
In this step, two kinds of HMMs can be trained: (a) A speaker-specific model
can be obtained by training the HMM with traces of VoIP calls made by Alice. (b) For
speeches detection, we focus on detecting speeches made by one specific speaker, say
19
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Alice. So a speech-specific model can be obtained by training the model with traces of
the same speech made by Alice. The trained HMMs are used in the following speech
detection or speaker detection step.
3.3.4 Speech Detection and Speaker Detection
The inputs to this step are the Alice’s speech-specific or the Alice’s speaker-
specific HMM trained in the previous step and feature vectors generated from a pool
of raw VoIP traces of interest. The output of this step is the intermediate detection
result. For the speaker detection, the intermediate detection result is Ktop speakers
from the candidate pool with talk patterns closest to Alice’s talk pattern. For the
speech detection, the intermediate detection result isKtop speeches from the candidate
pool with speech patterns closest to speech patterns in training traces.
The detection step can be divided into two phases: (a) First, the likelihood of
each feature vector is calculated with the trained HMM. (b) The trace with the highest
likelihood is declared as the trace generated from one specific speech or by Alice if
the intersection step is not used. To improve detection accuracy, the intermediate
20
detection results can be fed into the optional intersection attack step.
3.3.5 Intersection Attack
The intersection step is designed to improve detection accuracy. The input to
this step is the intermediate detection result from the previous step. The output is a
final detection result.
The main idea of the intersection attack step is similar as described in [36, 37,
38]: Instead of making a detection decision result based on one trial, we can improve
detection accuracy by a number of trials and the final detection result is determined
by combining (or intersecting) the results from all trials.
More specifically, for the proposed attacks, suppose it is possible to get m VoIP
call traces made by the same speaker, the adversary can have m trails as described
in Section 3.3.4. From each detection, the adversary can obtain Ktop traces with Ktop
highest likelihoods. The overall rank for each speaker is calculated by adding ranks
in m trails. The speaker with highest rank is determined to be Alice. Tie can be
broken by comparing the sum of likelihood in m trails.
In summary, the proposed traffic analysis attacks can be divided into two
phases: the training phase and the detection phase. Since application-level features
are extracted from VoIP calls, the traffic analysis attacks are independent from codecs
used for VoIP communication. In other words, it is possible to train the HMM with
traces of VoIP calls made with one codec and detect speeches or speakers of VoIP
calls made with another codec. We evaluate the proposed traffic analysis attacks with
empirical experiments as described below.
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Figure 8: Experiment Setup
Table II: Codec Information
Codec Sampling Frequency Frame Size Bit Rate Payload Size Packetization Delay
(kHz) (ms) (Kbit/s) (bits) (ms)
µlaw 8 (Narrowband) 10 64 1280 20
iLBC 8 (Narrowband) 20/30 15.2/13.3 304/400 30
BroadVoice-32 16 (Wideband) 5 32 160*n 20
3.4 Empirical Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed traffic analysis
attacks.
3.4.1 Experiment Setup
The experiment setup is as shown in Figure 8. VoIP packets are first directed
to the anonymity network managed by findnot.com before arriving at the other side
of the call. We use the commercial anonymous communication services provided by
findnot.com5 mainly because it is possible to select entry points into the anonymity
network [39]. In our experiments, VoIP packets were directed through entry points
5We did not use Tor [3] to anonymize VoIP calls because Tor has no direct support of anonymizing
UDP packets and VoIP packets generally are UDP packets.
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in England, Germany, and United States as shown in Figure 8. For these VoIP calls
made through anonymity networks, the end-to-end delay is at least 80ms and the two
communication parties are at least 20 hops away from each other. About a quarter of
calls are made through the campus network so that traces of VoIP calls over a wide
range of networks are available for our experiments.
The audio signals are extracted from videos hosted on Research Channels [40].
Traces used in both training and detection are 14.7 minutes long on average if not
specified6. For the purpose of intersection attacks, at least three different speeches are
available for most speakers and each speech was sent through at least four different
network entry points7. Totally 360 VoIP calls were made through different entry
points of the anonymity network managed by findnot.com and through the campus
network.
In our experiments, VoIP calls were made with X-Lite [28], one of the most
popular SIP-based VoIP clients. X-Lite supports a wide range of codecs for different
voice quality. We choose three popular and representative codecs of high, medium,
and low bit rates for our experiments. More information about these three codecs is
listed in Table II.
3.4.2 Metrics
We use detection rate to measure effectiveness of the proposed attacks. In this
chapter, detection rate is defined as the ratio of the number of successful detections
to the number of attempts.
For both speech detection and speaker detection with traces generated by the
same codec, the detection rate for random guess is about 1
109
, because in each trial,
6For fair comparison, traces used in experiments contain the same number of talk periods. In
other words, feature vectors generated from these traces are of the same length. Because of the
difference in length of talk periods in different traces, traces are of different length in minutes.
7The campus network entry point is one of the choices.
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there are around 109 candidate traces in the pool if the pool size is not specified. One
of the traces in the pool is the “right” trace, i.e., the trace generated by a specific
speech. In each trial of speech detection, three traces of the same speech are used
for training and one trace of the same speech is one of the candidate traces. In each
trial of speaker detection, one trace of Alice’s speeches is used as one of the candidate
traces and Alice’s other traces are used for training.
For cross-codec detection, i.e., detection with traces generated from all codecs
used in experiments, the detection rate for random guess is about 1
325
, because in each
trial, there are around 325 candidate traces in the pool including the “right” trace.
In each trial of speech detection, eleven traces of the same speech from three different
codecs are used for training and one trace of the same speech is one of the candidate
traces. In each trial of speaker detection, one trace of Alice’s speeches is used as one
of the candidate traces and Alice’s other traces are used for training.
In all the experiments below, the training traces and candidate traces are all
collected from different VoIP calls. For better training, all the traces used in training
are collected from sending side, i.e., from the link connected to Alice’s computer.
3.4.3 Threshold Tsilence
This series of experiments are designed to test the effect of the parameter
Tsilence, the threshold used in silence tests.
Figure 9 shows speech detection performance with different threshold Tsilence.
In both Figure 9 and Figure 10, each detection rate is obtained based on 120 trials.
From Figure 9, we can observe: (a) For a wide range of Tsilence, the detection
rate is larger than 0.5, about 55-fold over random guess. The detection rate can
be higher than 0.55 for all the three codecs, so more than 61-fold improvement over
random guess. For BoradVoice-32 codec, the detection rate can reach 0.66. (b) In
24
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Figure 9: Speech Detection Performance with Different Threshold Tsilence
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Figure 10: Speaker Detection Performance with Different Threshold Tsilence
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general, the detection rate increases when the threshold Tsilence increases. When
Tsilence becomes large, the detection rate may drop simply because shorter feature
vectors are used for training and detection. When Tsilence is larger than 0.512s,
feature vectors are too short for detection so that the HMM training cannot converge
for the certain traces. (c) The detection rate for candidate traces collected from
sending side is comparable with the detection rate for candidate traces collected from
receiving side. It is because filtering techniques used in silence tests can largely filter
out noise caused by random network delays at receiving side which can vary from
call to call. Similar observations can be made from Figure 10. The detection rate for
speaker detection can reach 0.32, about 35-fold improvement over random guess. In
the following experiments, we set Tsilence to be 0.412 second.
3.4.4 Length of Training and Test Traces
This set of experiments are designed to investigate the effect of the length of
training and test traces on the detection performance. Since in general, the training
traces should be longer than test traces for better training, we vary the average
length of training traces from 5.4 minutes to 14.7 minutes and the average length of
test traces varies from 1.9 minutes to the average length of training traces used in the
same detection.
From experiment results shown in Figure 11, we can observe that even for
five-minute-long training and test traces, the detection rate for speech detection and
speaker detection can achieve 0.20 and 0.12, about 22-fold and 13-fold improvement
over random guess respectively. Figure 11 also shows that the detection rate increases
with the length of training traces and the length of test traces. In the following
experiments, we fix the average length of training traces and test traces to be 14.7
minutes.
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Figure 11: Detection Performance with Different Length of Training Traces and Test
Traces
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Figure 12: Detection Performance with Different Pool Size
3.4.5 Pool Size
In this set of experiments, we investigate detection performance with different
sizes of candidate pools. From the experiment results shown in Figure 12, we can
observe that when the pool size increases, the detection rate slightly decreases for all
the codecs, since it is harder to find the right one from a larger pool. But the ratio
between the speech detection rate and random guess rate changes from 20 to 70, when
the pool size changes from 28 to 109, meaning the traffic analysis attacks are more
effective when the pool size is large. We can also observe that for the µlaw codec, one
of the most frequently used codec in VoIP telephony, the speech detection and the
speaker detection can achieve detection rate of 0.72 and 0.65 when the pool size is
28, approximately 20-fold and 70-fold improvement over random guess respectively.
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Figure 13: Cross-Codec Detection Performance with Different Threshold Tsilence
3.4.6 Cross-Codec Detection
In this set of experiments, training traces and traces to be detected are gener-
ated with different codecs. We believe this set of experiments are important because:
(a) Practically training traces and the traces to be detected can be collected from
calls made with different codecs. (b) Since VoIP packets are encrypted and possibly
padded to a fixed length, adversaries may not be able to differentiate VoIP calls made
with different codecs.
Figure 13 shows performance of cross-codec detection with different threshold
Tsilence. Each detection rate in Figure 13 is obtained based on about 360 trials.
We can observe that the detection rates for speech detection and speaker detection
can reach 0.61 and 0.31 respectively, about 203-fold and 103-fold improvement over
random guess.
Figure 14 shows the detection performance with different length of training
traces and test traces. We can again observe the detection rate increases with the
length of training traces and test traces. The speech detection and speaker detection
with only five minutes of training traces and test traces can achieve 0.12 and 0.21,
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Figure 15: Cross-Codec Detection Performance with Different Pool Size
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Table III: Performance of Intersection Attacks Combined with Cross-Codec Speaker
Detection
Tsilence (ms) Ktop = 1 Ktop = 2 Ktop = 4 Ktop = 8
212 0.3500 0.3625 0.3750 0.4000
412 0.4325 0.4500 0.6000 0.6250
40-fold and 70-fold improvement over random guess respectively.
Figure 15 shows the detection performance with different sizes of candidate
pools. We can again observe that the detection rate decreases slightly with the
increase of pool size. When the pool size is 82, the speech detection and speaker
detection can achieve 0.72 and 0.60 respectively.
3.4.7 Intersection Attack
In this set of experiments, we evaluate the effectiveness of intersection attacks
on cross-codec speaker detection. On average, there are 37 candidate speakers in each
trial. So the detection rate for random guess is about 1
37
. Each candidate speaker
has 9 VoIP traces available for detections. So the final detection result is obtained by
combining the intermediate detection results of 9 trials.
Table III shows the performance of intersection attack: First, intersection at-
tacks greatly improve the performance of cross-codec speaker detection. Second, the
detection rate can reach 0.625, about 25-fold improvement over random guess.
In summary, the proposed traffic analysis attacks can significantly improve the
detection rate over random guess. We believe that given more training traces, higher
detection rate can be achieved.
3.5 Detecting Speaker without Candidate Pools
The initial threat model assumes that the “right” speaker is in a candidate pool.
Although the assumption is valid for applications similar as identifying a human being
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with a group of fingerprints collected from a crime scene, we would like to investigate
the detection performance without the assumption of candidate pools.
Instead we assume that the adversary possesses traces of VoIP calls made by
Alice and other persons. We call these traces as labeled traces since these traces are
collected in advance and the adversary knows the identities of callers. The goal of
the adversary is to detect, whether Alice is the speaker of a VoIP call of interest.
3.5.1 Detection Approach
We modify the detection approach for the new traffic analysis attack as follows:
1 The adversary splits the labeled traces of Alice’s calls into two halves. An HMM
to model Alice’s talk pattern is established based on the first half of the traces.
2 A detection threshold Tlik is determined based on remaining labeled traces in-
cluding the second half of traces of Alice’s calls. The adversary evaluates each of
these traces against Alice’s model and calculates its likelihood. Given a thresh-
old Tlik, the false positive rate and the false negative rate on the remaining
labeled traces can be calculated as follows: (a) False negative rate is defined as
the proportion of Alice’s calls detected as calls made by other speakers, i.e., the
proportion of Alice’s calls with likelihood values less than Tlik. (b) False positive
rate is defined as the proportion of calls made by other speakers detected as
Alice’s calls, i.e., the proportion of other speakers’ calls with likelihood values
larger than Tlik. The threshold Tlik is selected so that the detection rates on the
remaining traces are maximized and both the false negative rate and the false
positive rate on the remaining labeled traces are below a tolerance threshold
Ttol.
3 The adversary makes a detection decision by evaluating a given trace with
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Alice’s HMM. If the calculated likelihood is larger than Tlik, the given trace is
declared as a trace of Alice’s call. Otherwise, the trace is declared as a trace
made by other speakers.
3.5.2 Performance Evaluation
We evaluate the detection performance with four metrics: detection rate, false
negative rate, false positive rate, and percentage of traces which can be tested. The
two metrics, the false negative rate and the false positive rate used in performance
evaluation, are calculated on the test traces. The last metric, percentage of traces
which can be tested, is needed because for certain traces, it is impossible to find a
threshold Tlik so that both false negative rate and false positive rate on the labeled
traces are below a given tolerance Ttol.
In this set of experiments, the average length of labeled traces and test traces
are 14.7 minutes. In each detection, there are 54 labeled traces and 6 traces of Alice’s
calls. The experiment results are averaged over 120 tests.
Experiment results shown in Figure 16 indicate that detection rate decreases
when the tolerance Ttol increases and in the mean time, the percentage of trace which
can be tested increases. A smaller tolerance Ttol means better training, and in turn,
better detection performance. A smaller tolerance Ttol also means stricter require-
ments so fewer traces can be tested. We can also observe that the detection rate can
reach 0.89 when Ttol = 0.1 and only 1% traces can be tested. When Ttol = 1, i.e., all
the traces can be tested, the detection rate is 0.63.
3.6 A Countermeasure and Its Performance
From the discussion above, it is apparent that the proposed traffic analysis
attacks can greatly compromise the privacy of encrypted VoIP calls. Countermeasures
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Figure 16: Detection Performance
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Figure 17: Countermeasure: Camouflaging Alice’s VoIP Packets
are needed for privacy protection. In this section, we introduce a countermeasure
which can both protect privacy with only marginally effect on quality of service (QoS)
of VoIP calls.
3.6.1 Overview
Simple countermeasures to the proposed traffic analysis attacks include padding
VoIP traffic to constant rate traffic or randomly delaying VoIP packets to hide talk
patterns. These simple approaches may render the proposed traffic analysis attacks
ineffective. But these approaches can cause significant waste of bandwidth or degrade
the QoS of VoIP calls significantly.
The main idea of our countermeasure is to camouflage the timing of Alice’s
VoIP packets according to another speaker’s traces. As shown in Figure 17, Alice’s
VoIP packets are first kept in a buffer. A token will be generated when it is time
to send a packet according to Speaker X’s VoIP traces. The transmissions of Alice’s
VoIP packets are controlled by these tokens. The transmission control in Figure 32
functions as follows: (a) Each packet transmission consumes a token. (b) When a
token is generated and the buffer is not empty, transmission control will transmit the
first packet in the buffer. (c) When a token is generated and the buffer is empty, a
dummy packet is transmitted by the transmission control. (d) When Nbuff packets
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are held in the buffer and no token is available, the first packet in the buffer will be
transmitted.
For the proposed countermeasure, dummy packets are sent only when necessary
for camouflaging. The parameter Nbuff is used to control queuing delays. This
parameter should be carefully chosen to balance the QoS of VoIP calls and privacy
protection to defeat traffic analysis attacks.
3.6.2 Performance Evaluation of the Countermeasure
We evaluate the countermeasure with two metrics: (a) The detection rate
defined in Section 3.4.2: It is used to measure the performance of privacy protection
of VoIP calls. (b) Additional packet delays caused by the countermeasure: It measures
the degradation of the QoS of VoIP calls.
In this set of experiments, we use real traces collected from the experiment
environment described in Section 3.4.1.
Figure 18 shows the performance of the countermeasure. The threshold Tsilence
is set to 0.412s and the corresponding detection rate is 0.6 a threshold with as shown in
Figure 9. Figure 18(a) shows that the countermeasure can protect the privacy of VoIP
calls since most detection rates are around the probability of random guess. Figure
18(b) shows additional packet delays caused by the countermeasure. When Nbuff is
50 and 100, the additional delays caused by the countermeasure is less than 36ms and
68ms with a probability larger than 0.95 respectively. So the countermeasure will not
cause any significant change in the quality of VoIP calls since the additional delays
for Nbuff = 50 and Nbuff = 100 are still less than one third of and half of the delay
budget for VoIP calls [41] respectively. The detection rates for small Nbuff , such as
Nbuff = 1 and Nbuff = 10, cannot be obtained from experiments, because Nbuff is
too small and no silence gaps can be found in privacy VoIP traces.
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Figure 18: Performance of the Proposed Countermeasure
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3.7 Discussion and Future Work
Our experiments clearly show that the proposed traffic analysis attacks can
greatly compromise privacy of VoIP calls. The detection rates for speech detection
and speaker detection are 70-fold and 35-fold improvement over random guess. Higher
detection rate can be achieved with more training traces.
Comparable detection performances are achieved for both traces collected by
sending side and receiving side. It is an indication that when the threshold is large
enough, feature extracted in the proposed attacks are largely independent of network
dynamics.
The framework proposed in this chapter, including extracting application-level
features from network traffic traces and statistical analysis of extracted application-
level feature by HMMs, can be potentially used to infer other sensitive information
at application level. For example, the framework can be potentially used to detect
speaker’s emotion during a call suppose the speaker’s talk behavior can change signif-
icantly when the speaker’s mood changes. The framework may also be used to detect
different types of speeches such as seminar talk, conversation between two parties,
and classroom discussion. One of our future works is to explore the potential of the
framework experimentally and theoretically.
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CHAPTER IV
TRAFFIC ANALYSIS ATTACKS ON
SKYPE VOIP CALLS
In this chapter, we address on privacy issues of Skype calls. Skype is one
of the most popular VoIP service providers. Skype VoIP services are provided on
a peer-to-peer structure. Skype peers form an overlay network. A Skype call may
be dynamically routed through Skype peers during the call for better Quality of
Service (QoS) [42]. One of the main reasons for the popularity of Skype VoIP services
is its unique set of features to protect privacy of VoIP calls such as strong encryption
[43], proprietary protocols [43], unknown codecs [44], dynamic path selection [42],
and the constant packet rate [45].
In this chapter, we propose a class of passive traffic analysis attacks to compro-
mise privacy of Skype calls. The procedure of proposed attacks is as follows: First the
adversary collected Skype call traces made by a victim, say Alice. The adversary then
extracts application-level features of Alice’s VoIP calls and trains a Hidden Markov
Model (HMM) with the extracted features. To test whether a call of interest is made
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by Alice, the adversary can extract features from the trace of the call and calculate
likelihood of the call being made by Alice. The proposed attacks can identify speeches
or speakers of Skype calls with high probabilities.
4.1 Problem Definition
In this chapter, we focus on traffic analysis on Skype VoIP calls through
anonymity networks to disclose sensitive information at application-level. More specif-
ically, we are interested in detecting speeches and speakers of Skype VoIP calls by
analyzing traffic patterns at the application-level.
A typical attack scenario focused in this chapter is as follows: An adversary
who has possession of traces of previous Skype VoIP calls made by a victim, say Alice,
may want to detect whether Alice is talking to Bob now by collecting Skype packets
on the link to Bob. The adversary may also want to detect the speech content, such
as the repetition of a partial speech in previous Skype calls.
In this chapter, we assume that traffic traces used in analysis can be collected
at different time. This is the major difference between our research and the previous
researches. Most of the previous researches assume that the adversary has simulta-
neous access to both links connected to Alice and Bob during the Skype call between
Alice and Bob. By passively correlating VoIP flows at both ends or actively water-
marking VoIP flows, the adversary can detect whether Alice is communicating with
Bob. But for the typical attack scenario described above, both flow correlation and
watermarking techniques do not work because traces to be compared are collected
from different VoIP calls: (a) Correlation between different calls is low. (b) Water-
marks used to mark traffic flows of Alice’s VoIP calls can be different for different
calls because of recycling watermarks or simply because Alice is making a call from
a different computer.
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4.1.1 Network Model
In the chapter, we assume Alice makes VoIP calls by Skype. We are particularly
interested in Skype VoIP calls because: (a) Skype is based on peer-to-peer structure.
During a Skype call, VoIP packets may follow more than one path through different
Skype peers or Skype supernodes [42]. The peer-to-peer structure and dynamic path
selection make security attacks or eavesdropping on Skype calls more difficult. (b)
Skype uses proprietary protocols so that attackers cannot differentiate media packets
from signaling packets. (c) Skype uses unknown codecs that renders traffic analysis
exploiting characteristics of voice codecs nearly impossible [44]. (d) Skype calls are
encrypted and hard to decipher [43]. (e) Skype sends packets at the constant rate of 33
packet/second [45]. Due to the unique set of features listed above, Skype is known as
secure voice communication [43] which can protect privacy of communication parties.
As shown in Figure 19, we assume Alice routes Skype calls through anonymity
networks to further protect privacy of her Skype calls. For better voice quality, Alice
can use low-latency anonymity networks such as Tor and JAP.
4.1.2 Threat Model
We focus on passive attacks in this thesis. In other words, the attacks launched
by the adversary do not disturb the existing network traffic. In comparison with active
traffic analysis attacks [8, 46], the proposed attacks are harder to detect.
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We assume that the adversary only has access to the links directly connected
to participants of VoIP calls. This assumption is widely used in traffic analysis at-
tacks such as attacks on anonymity networks [8]. We do not assume the adversary
as a global attacker because re-routing techniques used in anonymity networks and
dynamic path selection employed by Skype make global attacks too costly to be
practical.
Our threat model does not require simultaneous access to the links connected
to participants of a VoIP call since it may not be feasible for long-distance calls,
such as international calls. Instead we assume the adversary can collect traces of
VoIP calls made by Alice in advance and use these collected traces to detect whether
Alice is a participant in the VoIP conversation of interest. Our model is similar as the
model for identifying a human being by fingerprints: Fingerprints of human beings are
collected in advance through driver license applications. To identify a specific person,
the fingerprint of interest such as a fingerprint in a crime scene will be compared
against the person’s fingerprints collected in advance.
The threat model assumes the detections are based on different Skype calls.
So the speaker identification should also be independent of the voice content of Skype
calls.
4.2 Detecting Speech and Speaker of Skype-Based
VoIP Calls
In this section, we describe traffic analysis attacks to detect speeches or speak-
ers of encrypted VoIP calls. We begin the section with an overview of the proposed
traffic analysis attack and details of each step in our algorithm are described after
the overview.
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Figure 20: An Example
4.2.1 Overview
The proposed traffic analysis attacks are based on packet size information.
A simple experiment shown in Figure 20 indicates that packet size information can
disclose speech-level information. Figure 20(a) shows an audio signal with three
silence periods. Figure 20(b) shows the packet sequence generated by feeding the
audio signal into Skype clients. From the packet sequence plotted in Figure 20(b), we
can observe: (a) Even during silent periods, Skype clients still generate packets at a
constant rate. (b) During silent periods, VoIP packets generated by Skype are small
in comparison with packets generated during talk periods. We do not focus on packet
timing information in this chapter mainly because Skype clients send VoIP packets
at a constant rate [45].
One of the challenges in this chapter is to extract application-level features from
collected VoIP packet traces, i.e., features existing in different VoIP calls. Based on
the features existing in different VoIP calls, traffic analysis attacks can possibly detect
speeches or speakers of VoIP calls. The feature used in the proposed attacks is the
throughput vector [s1, s2, · · · , sn], where n is the length of the vector. The element
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si in the throughput vector is calculated as follows:
si =
sum of bytes received or sent during the ith sample interval
T
(4.1)
where T is the length of sample intervals.
The length of sample interval T should be selected in the order of seconds for
the following two reasons: (a) Because of re-routing techniques used in anonymity
networks and dynamic path selection employed in Skype, VoIP packets can arrive
at destination in an order different from the order at sending end. A larger sample
interval can largely absorb the difference. This is also the reason why we do not use
per-packet size as the feature vector. (b) Talk patterns are of low frequency while
network dynamics is of higher frequency. Network dynamics is usually in the order of
millisecond while the patterns such as silent periods are in the order of seconds [47, 48].
The averaging effect of sample intervals is equivalent as low-pass filtering. A larger
sample interval in the order of seconds can filter out network dynamics information
which can vary from call to call and keep the low-frequency talk patterns.
The Hidden Markov Model (HMM) has been introduced in 3.3.3. In the pro-
posed attacks, HMMs are trained to model talk patterns used for speech detection or
speaker detection.
The proposed attacks can be divided into two phases: the training phase and
the detection phase as shown in Figure 21. The two steps in the training phase are
feature extraction and HMMs training. The detection phase consists of three steps:
feature extraction, speech detection or speaker detection, and intersection attack.
The last step, intersection attack, is optional. We describe the details of each step
below.
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Figure 21: Steps of The Proposed Attacks
4.2.2 Feature Extraction
The input and output of the feature extraction step are raw traces of VoIP
calls and throughput vectors respectively.
Two parameters are used in this step to control the generation of throughput
vectors: (a) Length of sample interval T : As described in Section 4.2.1, the length
of sample interval should be large enough to filter out network dynamics different
from call to call and keep talk patterns. At the same time, it is desired to select
a sample interval small enough so that throughput vectors are long enough for the
training purpose. (b) Threshold on packet size Hpacket: The threshold is used to
filter out signaling packets and excluding signaling packets can lead to better trained
HMMs of talk patterns. Since Skype uses proprietary protocols, unknown codecs, and
encryption, it is impossible to separate signaling packets based on protocol headers.
We heuristically differentiate signaling packets from media packets by the threshold
Hpacket: Signaling packets are usually smaller than media packets. In raw VoIP traces,
we also find that packets of small and fixed sizes are sent or received periodically and
independent of speech activities. The guidelines on the choice of these two parameters
are given in Section 4.3.
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Figure 22: Left-right Hidden Markov Model
4.2.3 HMM Training
The input and output of this step are throughput vectors and trained HMMs
respectively.
The Markov Model is a tool to model a stochastic process with the Markov
property that the transition from the current state to the next state depends only on
the current state, i.e., independent from the past states. In a Hidden Markov Model,
the state is not directly visible, but outputs influenced by the state are observed. Each
state has a probability distribution over the possible outputs. Therefore the sequence
of outputs generated by an HMM gives some information about the sequence of states.
In the proposed attacks, HMMs are trained to model talk patterns used for
speech detection or speaker detection. More specifically, the attacks are based on
on-off patterns of silence in speeches which have been used as one feature for speaker
detection [49]. As shown in Figure 20, the on-off patterns in speeches can be possibly
recovered from packet size. But the pattern recovery is noisy because: (a) It is
impossible to differentiate voice packets from signaling packets. (b) A sample interval
may contain several on-off periods or may be a part of a long silent gap or talk spurt.
Ideally only two states, talk and silence, are enough to model talk patterns with a
voice silence detector as used in [49]. Because of the noise in pattern recovery, more
states of different combinations of on-off periods are used in the HMM. The number
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Figure 23: Detection Rate with Different Number of States
of states in HMM is heuristically set to be eight according to the length of through
vectors. Following the principle of Occam’s razor, the number of states should be
small enough to avoid over-fitting and large enough to model the ergodic nature of
VoIP calls. We get similar detection performance for different number of states when
the number of states is larger than five, as shown in Figure 23. When the number of
state is too large, the training of HMMs fails to converge to an optimal solution.
The HMM used in traffic analysis attacks is the left-right HMM [34] as shown
in Figure 22. We choose the left-right model because of the nonergodic nature of
speech signals [34], i.e., the attribute of signals whose properties change over time.
Each node in Figure 22 represents a state in one sample interval. The observable
variable is the throughput of each sample interval.
Two kinds of HMMs can be trained: (a) For the speech detection, we focus
on detecting speeches made by one specific speaker, say Alice. So a speech-specific
model can be obtained by training the model with traces of the same speeches made
by Alice. (b) A speaker-specific model can be obtained by training the HMM with
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traces of VoIP calls made by a specific speaker. The trained HMMs are used in the
following speech detection or speaker detection.
4.2.4 Speech Detection and Speaker Detection
The inputs to this step are the Alice’s speech-specific or the Alice’s speaker-
specific HMM trained in the previous step and throughput vectors generated from
a candidate pool of raw VoIP traces of interest. The output of this step is the
intermediate detection result. For the speaker detection, the intermediate detection
result isKtop speakers from the candidate pool with talk pattens closest to Alice’s talk
pattern. For the speech detection, the intermediate detection result is Ktop speeches
from the candidate pool with speech pattens closest to talk patterns in training traces.
The detection step can be divided into two phases: (a) First, the likelihood of
each throughput vector is calculated with the trained HMM. (b) The trace with the
highest likelihood is declared as the trace generated from a specific speech by Alice
if intersection attack is not used. To improve detection accuracy, the intermediate
detection results can be fed into the optional step, intersection attack.
4.2.5 Intersection Attack
The intersection step is designed to improve detection accuracy. The input to
this step is the intermediate detection result from the previous step. The output is a
final detection result.
The main idea of the intersection attack is similar as described in [36, 37,
38]: Instead of deciding the detection result based on one trial, we can improve
detection accuracy by a number of trials and the final detection result is determined
by combining (or intersecting) the results from each trial.
More specifically, for the proposed attacks, suppose it is possible to getm Skype
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Figure 24: Experiment Setup
call traces made by the same speaker, the adversary can do m trials as described in
Section 4.2.4. From each detection, the adversary can obtain k traces with the Ktop
highest likelihoods. The overall rank for each speaker is calculated by adding ranks
in m trials. The speaker with the highest rank is determined to be Alice. Tie can be
broken by comparing the sum of likelihood in m trials.
4.3 Empirical Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed detections.
4.3.1 Experiment Setup
The experiment setup is as shown in Figure 24. Skype packets are first di-
rected to the anonymity network managed by findnot.com and then relayed by Skype
peers or supernodes before arriving at the other end of the call. We use the commer-
cial anonymous communication services provided by findnot.com mainly because it is
possible to select entry points into the anonymity network [39]. In our experiments,
Skype packets are directed through entry points in England, Germany, and United
States as shown in Figure 24. For these Skype calls made through anonymity net-
works, the end-to-end delay is at least 80ms and the two communication parties are
at least 20 hops away from each other. About a quarter of calls are made through
the campus network so that traces of VoIP calls over a wide range of networks are
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available for our experiments.
The audio signals are extracted from videos posted on Research Channels [40]
for consistent sound quality. The length of extracted audio signals is about 38.5
minutes. At least three different speeches are available for most speakers and each
speech is sent through at least four different network entry points1. In total 116 Skype
calls are made through different entry points of the anonymity network managed by
findnot.com and through the campus network.
4.3.2 Metrics
We use detection rate to measure effectiveness of the proposed attacks. In
this chapter, the detection rate is defined as the ratio of the number of successful
detections to the number of attempts.
For both speech detection and speaker detection, the detection rate for random
guess is about 1
105
, because in each trial, there are 105 candidate traces in the pool on
average. One of the traces in the pool is the “right” trace, i.e., the trace generated
by a specific speech or speaker. In each trial of the speech detection, three traces of
the same speech are used for training and one trace of the same speech is one of the
candidate traces. In each trial of the speaker detection, one trace of Alice’s speech is
used as one of the candidate traces and Alice’s other traces are used for training.
In all the experiments below, the training traces and candidate traces are all
collected from different Skype calls. For better training, all the traces used in training
are collected from the sending end, i.e., from the link connected to Alice’s computer.
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Figure 25: Effect of Parameter T on Speech Detection
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Figure 26: Effect of Parameter T on Speaker Detection
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4.3.3 Effect of Parameter T (Length of Sample Interval)
This series of experiments are designed to test the effect of the parameter T ,
the length of sample intervals.
Figure 25 shows the effect of the parameter T on speech detection. From these
two figures, we can observe: (a) For a wide range of T , the detection rate is larger
than 0.1, about 10-fold improvement over random guess. (b) When T is small, the
detection rate is relatively low. It is because a small T cannot be used to extract
talk patterns usually in the order of second as discussed in Section 4.2.1. (c) When
T becomes large, the detection rate may drop simply because shorter throughput
vectors are used for training and detection. (d) The detection rate can be as high
as 0.33, about 35-fold improvement over random guess. (e) The detection rate for
candidate traces collected from the sending end is comparable with the detection rate
for candidate traces collected from the receiving end. It is because T is big enough to
filter out network dynamics at receiving end which can vary from call to call. Similar
observations can be made from Figure 26. The detection rate for speaker detection
can reach 0.18, about 18-fold improvement over random guess.
4.3.4 Effect of Parameter Hpacket (Threshold on Packet Size)
This series of experiments are designed to test the effect of the parameter
Hpacket, the threshold on packet size.
Figure 27 shows the effect of the parameter Hpacket on speech detection. From
Figure 27, we can observe: (a) When Hpacket is less than 100 bytes, the detection rate
is low. We believe it is because small Hpacket cannot be used to remove all signaling
packets. (b) When Hpacket is larger than 130 bytes, the detection rate may decrease.
The reason is too few packets left because of the larger threshold. (c) The detection
1The campus network entry point is one of the choices.
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Figure 27: Effect of Parameter Hpacket on Speech Detection
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Figure 28: Effect of Parameter Hpacket on Speaker Detection
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rate for speech detection can achieve 0.33, about 35-fold improvement over random
guess.
Figure 28 shows the effect of the parameter Hpacket on speaker detection. We
can observe: (a) The best range of Hpacket for speaker detection is from 110 bytes to
130 bytes. (b) The detection rate can reach to 0.2, about 20-fold improvement over
random guess.
4.3.5 Length of Training Traces and Test Traces
The length of training traces and test traces available for traffic analysis largely
determines the effectiveness of proposed traffic analysis. In this set of experiments, we
evaluate performance of the proposed attacks with different length of training traces
and test traces. Figure 29 shows the experiment results on length of test traces.
The results are obtained with training traces of length 38.5 minutes, T = 110s, and
Hpacket = 120bytes. We can observe that the detection rates for both speech detection
and speaker detection increase with the length of test traces. When test traces are 25
minutes long, the detection rates for speech detection and speaker detection are 0.28
and 0.18, about 28-fold and 18-fold improvement over random guess respectively.
4.3.6 Pool Size
In this set of experiments, we investigate the performance of traffic analysis
attacks with different size of candidate pools. From the experiment results shown
in Figure 30, we can observe that when the pool size increases, the detection rate
slightly decreases for both speech detection and speaker detection, since it is harder
to find the right one from a larger candidate pool. But the ratio between the speech
detection rate and the corresponding random guess rate changes from 12.59, when
pool size is 27, to 35 when pool size is 105, meaning the traffic analysis attacks are
57
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Speaker Detection
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more effective when the pool size is large.
4.3.7 Intersection Attack
In this set of experiments, we evaluate the effectiveness of intersection attacks
on speaker detection. On average, there are 33 candidate speakers. So the detection
rate for random guess is about 1
33
. Each candidate speaker has 3 Skype traces available
for detection so the final detection result is obtained by combining the intermediate
detection results of three trials.
From previous experiments, we learned specify explicitly suitable ranges for
parameters T and Hpacket to achieve higher detection rate. We use parameters in
these ranges in the intersection attacks described below and parameters used in the
following experiments are given in figures.
Figure 31 shows the performance of the intersection attack. From Figure 31,
we can observe: (a) In general, when Ktop, the number of most likely candidates
selected from each trial, increases, the detection rate increases because more high-
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likelihood traces are considered in the intersection attack step. (b) The detection
rate can reach 0.44, about 15-fold improvement over random guess. (c) The detection
rate for candidate traces collected from the sending end is again comparable with the
detection rate for candidate traces collected from the receiving end.
In summary, the proposed traffic analysis attacks can significantly improve the
detection rate over random guess. We believe that given more training traces, higher
detection rates can be achieved.
4.4 A Countermeasure and Its Performance
From the discussion above, it is apparent that the proposed traffic analysis
attacks can greatly compromise the privacy of Skype calls. Countermeasures are
needed to protect privacy of Skype calls. In this section, we introduce a countermea-
sure which can protect privacy at the cost of marginally effect on quality of VoIP
calls.
4.4.1 Overview
The main idea of the countermeasure is to camouflage Alice’s Skype packets
according to another speaker’s traces. As shown in Figure 32, Alice’s Skype packets
are re-packetized according to packet sizes of another speaker’s Skype packets. The
re-packetization is controlled by the byte tokens generated according to packet size
of Speaker X’s Skype packets: when it is time to send Speaker X’s Skype packet of
size v-byte, a v-byte token is generated to signal the re-packetization module to allow
v-byte Skype payload stored in buffer to be transmitted.
Another possible countermeasure is to pad all the packets to the same size. We
do not propose this countermeasure because: (a) A significant amount of bandwidth
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can be wasted to send padding bits. (b) Skype flows of constant packet sizes may
catch special interest from adversaries.
4.4.2 Performance Evaluation of The Countermeasure
We evaluate the countermeasure with two metrics: (a) The detection rate
defined in Section 4.3.2: It is used to measure the performance of preserving privacy
of Skype calls. (b) Packet delay caused by the countermeasure: We use it to measure
the degradation of quality of VoIP calls.
In this set of experiments, we use real traces collected from the experiment
environment described in Section 4.3.1.
Figure 33 shows the performance of the countermeasure. Figure 33(a) shows
that the countermeasure can preserve the privacy of Skype calls since the detection
rate is around the probability of random guess. Figure 33(b) shows the distribution
of packet delay caused by the countermeasure. The mean of the delay caused by the
countermeasure is 0.10ms. The delay is less than 0.102ms with a probability larger
than 0.95. So the delay caused by the countermeasure is negligible. In other words,
the countermeasure will not cause any significant change in the quality of Skype calls
since it is much less than the delay budget for VoIP calls [41].
4.5 Discussion and Future Work
Our experiments clearly show that the proposed traffic analysis attacks can
greatly compromise privacy of Skype calls. The detection rates for speech detection
and speaker detection are 35-fold and 15-fold improvement over random guess. Higher
detection rate can be achieved by adding more training traces.
The traditional speaker detection problem assuming access to speech signals
has been well studied [50]. In this chapter only noisy talk patterns recovered from
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packet sizes are available for traffic analysis. In [49], a speaker detection approach
based on face, mouth motion and silence detection is proposed. In comparison with
the 90% high detection rate achieved in [49], our detection rate is relatively low since
fewer features are available for traffic analysis.
The framework proposed in this chapter, including extracting application-level
features from network traffic traces and statistical analysis of extracted application-
level feature by the HMM, can be potentially used to infer other sensitive information
at application-level. For example, the framework can be potentially used to detect
speaker’s emotion during a call suppose the speaker’s talk behavior can change sig-
nificantly when the speaker’s mood changes. One of our future works is to explore
the potential of the framework.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis, we propose a class of passive traffic analysis attacks to com-
promise privacy of Skype calls and SIP-Based VoIP calls. The proposed attacks
are based on application-level features extracted from VoIP call traces. The proposed
attacks are evaluated by extensive experiments over different types of networks includ-
ing commercialized anonymity networks and our campus network. The experiments
show that the proposed traffic analysis attacks can detect speeches and speakers of
SIP based VoIP calls with 0.65 and 0.32 detection rate respectively, about 70-fold and
35-fold improvement over random guess. For Skype calls, the speech detection rate
and speaker detection rate are 0.33 and 0.44, about 30-fold and 15-fold improvement
over random guess. Countermeasures are proposed to mitigate the proposed traffic
analysis attacks by camouflaging. The proposed countermeasures can largely mitigate
the traffic analysis attacks and does not cause significant degradation on quality of
VoIP calls.
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